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ARTICLE
THE FUTURES PROBLEM
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most difficult problem in addressing mass torts is that
of future claimants. "Futures" are those who do not now have claims,
because injury has not been sufficiently manifested, but who may well
have claims in the future. The Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem1
and Ortiz2 appear to have foredoomed any procedural mechanism by
which to resolve future claims. This, in rnm, will leave defendants in
mass tort cases with greatly reduced incentives to participate in mass
settlement. That implication makes the possibility of reforms in sub-
stantive law perhaps more attractive. In addition, these decisions in-
vite further questions about the validity of class suit injunctions that
were adumbrated in Martin v. Wilks.
a
I. "FUTURES" iN MASS TORTS
As has often been noted, there are mass torts, and there are mass
torts.4 On one end are airplane crashes involving large passenger jets,
t Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
' Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (holding, inter alia,
that a class of plaintiffs certified solely for settlement of current and future asbestos-
related claims did not meet Rule 23 requirements).
2 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2307 (1999) (holding,
inter alia, that a class certification similar to that in Aachem was impermissible).
3 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that an absentee from a class suit settlement
was not bound by the decree); see Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Dis-
putes, 78 IoWA L. REv. 1011, 1012 (1993) (discussing Martin v. Wilks in the context of
"trilateral disputes---disputes in which there are at least three distinct interests in-
volved"); George M. Strickler, Jr., Martin v.Wilks, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557, 1606 (1990)
(analyzing the case and criticizing the current Supreme Court majority's wishes "to
discourage litigation like the Title VII class action that led to Martin v. Wilks").
4 See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Tort Cases, TRIAL, Sept. 1989, at 50 (distinguish-
ing between single-situs disasters, such as airplane crashes and building collapses, and
multi-situs disasters, such as toxic torts).
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in which there are hundreds of victims in a single traumatic misfor-
tune, typically all of whom are killed. On the other end are "toxic
torts," such as injuries from asbestos, drugs, or prosthetic devices,
where over a period of time an injurious product affects-at least, the
product is alleged to have affected--some victims with apparently se-
rious effects, some with moderate effects, and others with little or no
discernible effects. The two categories shade into each other but gen-
erally can be distinguished.
Substantially similar to the airplane crash cases, in terms of the le-
gal problems presented, are railroad and bus accidents, passenger ves-
sel sinkings, and food poisoning from a single batch of contaminated
victual. Ordinarily in these situations, each of the injured people can
be definitely identified, subject to verification from passenger lists or
fairly good circumstantial evidence such as specific purchase of food.
5
The number of victims in such cases is also usually definite and rarely
exceeds a few hundred. The basis of liability as regards the victims is
often fairly clear, although there may be difficult legal and factual is-
sues in allocating responsibility among defendants. Where the victims
have suffered death, as in air crashes, the damage claims will be eco-
nomic loss, perhaps loss of companionship, perhaps brief pain and
suffering, but not medical expenses or long term pain and suffering.
Thus, in these mass torts most, if not all, of the elements of obligation
to the victims usually will be ascertainable at an early stage.
Toxic torts, such as the asbestos claims and claims of harmful
drugs, present much more difficult evidentiary and administrative
problems. Toxic torts by definition involve a biological interaction
between the allegedly injurious substance and the victim. Most toxic
torts involve human victims, but there can be animal victims (poison-
ous feed, as in the British "mad cow" case) or plant victims.7 Biologi-
cal interactions, whether involving humans or animals or vegetation,
typically are very complex. This is particularly true where exposures
are relatively small or intermittent. Moreover, manifestation of injury
5 This characteristic brings to mind a mordantjoke that goes around the trial bar.
Question: What should the bus driver do first when there is an accident? Answer:
Close the doors.
6 See Richard Rhodes, Mad Cows and Americans, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1997 (Maga-
zine), at 13 (describing the genesis of mad cow disease which afflicts both human and
animal victims).
7 SeeJohn D. MacKinnon, ForidaJourna" Growers File New Suits on Benlate, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 3, 1999, at F1 (describing the protracted litigation over a fungicide manufac-
tured by Dupont that was alleged to have been "contaminated with a class of ultratoxic
herbicides" that caused widespread crop damage).
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may be long delayed from the time of exposure, sometimes for weeks
or months, sometimes-as in the case of asbestos-for years. In some
of these cases, correlation is readily established and sometimes so is
the physical etiology. Proof of causation often is not very definite,
however, and in many situations is a matter of gradation. In some in-
stances the proof of causation is based on probabilistic analysis and is
subject to more or less intense disputation. In some cases it may be
"obvious" that a causal relation is involved. In others there is a
boundary beyond which injury is speculative or de minimis, although
that point may be clear only in theory and difficult or impossible to
establish in fact.
Claims in this second category of cases typically involve problems
of "futures." As noted above, a "futures" claim is one where a claimant
cannot presently prove a causal connection between an injury and a
supposed source of injury, but nevertheless suspects or fears that he or
she is suffering injury that has its origin in the suspect source. The
lack of present proof means that the claimant generally cannot prop-
erly bring present suit. Bringing suit, even without good proof of cau-
sation, of course would open the way to discovery of evidence from
the defendants. Discovery may generate proof of causation, perhaps
through statistical analysis based on proof that there have been similar
cases that permit the inference of causation.8 Discovery, however, is
not guaranteed to produce positive results Moreover, serious legal
risks are entailed in bringing a premature claim: the defendant may
push the case to trial, opening the possibility that eventual judgment
may be adverse and in any event reducing the settlement value of the
claim. A claim brought prematurely may well be adjudicated on a ba-
8 The tobacco cases can be considered in this category. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 575 (1999) ("Plaintiffs may well
be able to establish, by means of experts and scientific and statistically based evidence,
what proportion of the medical care was provided to treat the effects of tobacco use.").
On the other hand, statistical analysis may require an inference of no causation, as in
the report concerning the breast implant claims. See Milo Geyelin & Laurie McGinley,
Panel Concludes There Is No Connection Between Implants and Major Diseases, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 1999, at B15 (noting that a panel of experts found "insufficient evidence to
conclusively link the devices to any major systemic diseases, such as cancer or connec-
tive-tissue disorders").
9 The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), signifies that a plaintiff must have reasonably good proof, statistical or
otherwise, to get beyond a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict. See
Kimberly H. Hrabosky, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael: Stretching Daubert Beyond Recogni-
tion, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 203, 204 (1999) (discussing the new standard created by
Kumho Tire which expands Dauberts holding to include nonscientific expert testi-
mony).
20001 1903
1904 UANVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1901
sis that results in res judicata, precluding later assertion at a subse-
quent stage when proof of causation is available.
In terms of available proof, and hence as a legal basis for suit and
a practical basis in settlement value, a futures claim therefore is a
premature claim.
II. CASES WITH No "FuTuRES" AND
MEDICAL MONITORING
As indicated above, some mass torts do not involve futures claims,
or at least none that create serious legal issues. All air crash victims
usually are dead and ordinarily can be identified as a basis for wrong-
ful death claims. rictims of other kinds of collisions-trains, buses,
etc.-usually can be counted, and a measurement of their damages is
no more difficult than in other personal injury cases. Some toxic
torts-the Thalidomide victims come to mind-also involve victims
whose identity and magnitude of injury is clear more or less immedi-
ately." The food poisoning cases typically involve a similarly confined
number of victims, with immediate causal consequences confined to
immediate injury or to mild injuries that are legally worth little more
than nuisance value or commercial good-will reparation."
These kinds of mass torts may involve large and complicated liti-
gation, but they are not "mass torts" for purposes of present discus-
sion. A large and complicated litigation may involve only a few claim-
ants who attempt to establish the question of liability, a determination
of compensatory damages and perhaps a determination of punitive
damages against the defendant or defendants. There can be difficult
and sometimes ugly questions of which of the claimants should go
first, of how the risks of outcome should be distributed among claim-
ants, and problems of allocation of burden and gain concerning
claimants litigation costs and attorneys' fees. These questions, how-
ever, typically are resolved by negotiation or, failing that, by a prelimi-
nary adjudication by the judge.
12
10 Thalidomide was the drug administered to pregnant women to control morning
sickness which, however, resulted in terrible deformation of the baby. See, e.g., Anita
Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts As a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 2153, 2154 (1997) (reviewing the Thalidomide disaster).
" For example, the Jack-in-the-Box food poisoning settlements. See, e.g., Jack in the
Box's Parent Firm Settles Suit for 1.3 Million, ORANGE COUNTIY REG. (Cal.), Feb. 17, 1994,
at C2 (noting settlement of "several dozen" cases with about 20 additional lawsuits
pending).
" See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
469, 506-07 (1994) ("While the attorney representing a large number of clients might,
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The large and complicated issues in these cases often can arise
from litigation among defendants to determine obligation and share
of liability. Illustrative of these situations are airplane crash cases
where liability to the victims is assumed but there is dispute among the
air carrier, plane manufacturer, and others as to specific cause and
fault. These too are what might be called big tort cases, but not "mass
torts." That is, they involve several parties, complex issues, and large
stakes. But that is true of many types of modem litigation, including
various kinds of financial and commercial litigation. They lack, how-
ever, the distinguishing feature of mass torts, which is the existence of
a large number of victims whose injuries are various, including some
victims who have very serious injuries and some whose injuries may be
exiguous or practically nil.
A subcategory of "fitures" cases are those involved in medical
monitoring. Medical monitoring is a procedure in which a set of pos-
sible victims is given periodic examinations to determine whether and
when they manifest symptoms that are believed to result from a speci-
fied source. 3 Those who eventually reveal no injury are dropped from
the group, usually with some payment for their trouble. Those who
eventually reveal the suspect symptoms become eligible as claimants,
either in conventional tort suit or through some stipulated compensa-
tion system. Typically, the cost of the monitoring is imposed on the
defendant. Medical monitoring is a useful device in various situations.
Indeed, in some situations a defendant may willingly join in request-
ing medical monitoring, in the hope and expectation that the results
will eliminate its liability or reduce it to definite proportions.
A decree requiring medical monitoring, however, has two prereq-
uisites. First, there must be sufficient proof of a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's activity and the injury. The strength of that
proof could vary from something like "reasonable suspicion" to
"probable cause" to proof sufficient to establish liability in favor of
some of the persons in the victim group.14 Of course, a target defen-
in theory, be able to reach some approximation of the objectives of the group as a
whole, that attorney cannot possibly account for the varying desires of individual
members of the group.").
Is SeeBill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims forDamages from Toxic Expo-
sure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARYJ. ENVTL. L. 285, 294-95 (1994) (outlining
the theory behind and early development of the medical monitoring concept). For a
case in which medical monitoring was ordered, see Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
863 P.2d 795, 822 (Cal. 1993).
4 See Potter, 863 P.2d at 824 (rejecting requirement that occurrence of disease be
"reasonably certain" and holding that the tests themselves must be reasonable in light
of the increase in risk); Ayers v.Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (find-
190520001
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dant could stipulate to medical monitoring upon a lesser showing, or
no showing at all, where the target considers the positive advantages
of its liability being excluded or mitigated. Conversely, it is not suffi-
cient for court-ordered medical monitoring that there be merely sus-
picion or fear of the ascribed cause.'5 The second prerequisite is that
the set of claimants be definitely ascertained.6 To be given the ex-
aminations, the population in question must be identified, either im-
mediately by name or by definite category through which they can be
sought out, for example, people living within X radius of Three Mile
Island.
17
A medical monitoring procedure thus is appropriate for a group
that consists of people who are presently identifiable as having been
exposed, even though it is uncertain whether some or any of them will
eventually manifest the feared malady. In this respect the monitored
group is similar to a set of present claimants in respects critical to ad-
ministration of mass torts justice: specific persons with an exposure
that is or appears plausibly to be causally related to a specific poten-
tially liable actor.
8
III. A "BANKRUPTCy" SOLUTION?
The legal problems posed by a set of "futures" in the administra-
ing medical monitoring damages appropriate where such monitoring is "reasonable
and necessary" in light of several factors, including "the relative increase in the chance
of onset of disease" and upholding medical monitoring even if the risk of disease was
just "slightly higher than the national average"); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993) (requiring proof that the exposure complained of in-
creased the "risk of the anticipated harm significantly over the plaintiff's risk prior to
exposure").
15 See Potter, 863 P.2d at 825 (noting "substantial evidentiary burdens" on a plaintiff
seeking medical monitoring damages).
16 One could establish a sample of a population for medical modeling. Unless the
boundaries of the population were specified, however, the evidence yielded from the
sample would be indeterminate.
17 On medical monitoring after the Three Mile Island nuclear facility matter, see
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 661, 703-04
(1992) (describing monitoring for plaintiffs living within a 25-mile radius of the facil-
i) The solution in Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), does not help.
The Sindell court imposed "market share" liability on a set of product manufacturers.
But the liability was in favor of consumers with manifestations causally related to the
product and against defendants, all of whom manufactured essentially the same prod-
uct. See Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share Liability in
Blood Products Litigation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 883, 886-88 (1994) (arguing "that the exten-
sion of market share liability principles to blood products litigation is illogical").
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don of mass torts justice are the converse of those presented in a case
suitable for medical monitoring. This is because a futures claimant is
one who cannot be specifically identified as being causally related to a
specific potentially liable actor. Stated in epistemological terms, a "fu-
tures" therefore is a hypothetical person. A hypothetical person can-
not have real legal rights or be owed real legal obligations. By the
same token, a hypothetical person cannot be the subject of a binding
determination except through the concept of an in rem proceeding.
It has therefore been suggested that bankruptcy, a classic form of in
rem proceeding, may be a feasible means of dealing with futures
claims.
It is familiar that an in rem proceeding poses the legal issue as fol-
lows: All persons who have or might have an interest in Xmust come
forth, within a specified time, or forever thereafter be precluded.19 As
the term "in rem" suggests, however, the concept of an in rem pro-
ceeding depends upon there being some thing that has value or is of
interest in terms that can be stated as a legal right. An in rem pro-
ceeding therefore can be predicated upon a specific item of prop-
erty-the traditional Blackacre--or on a bag of gold or on a bank ac-
count.20 By stretching the concept, an in rem proceeding can be
predicated upon a legal relationship between specific people, hence
the idea that divorce proceedings address a "status" that has existence
and location separate from the parties to the marriage.21 In the bank-
ruptcy concept, where an obligor, or potential obligor, has fewer as-
sets than liabilities, the obligor's entire estate can be treated as an ar-
ticle of property and made the subject of an in rem proceeding. This
last conception is of course the essence of bankruptcy procedure.
The concept of an obligor's estate being an article of property,
however, upon which the procedure in bankruptcy depends, unavoid-
ably entails the financial predicate that the assets of the obligor are
less than the liabilities. Measuring assets is not so difficult. Measuring
liabilities is not insuperably difficult if there is definite information as
to the number of claimants and as to the size of their claims. But
" See RESTATEME (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. a (1982) (questioning
whether the traditional distinction between in rem and quasi in rem proceedings is
useful for any purpose).
' See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950)
("Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been sometimes termed in rem,
or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely still, 'in the nature of a proceeding
in rem.'" (citation omitted)).
21 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (discussing divorce as address-
ing a status).
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measuring liabilities with any degree of accuracy is impossible if it is
unknown, for example, whether there are 10 claimants or 1000, or
perhaps 10,000, and unknown whether the average size of the claims
is $100 or $10,000 or $1 million.2
In my opinion the recent report of the Bankruptcy Commission
did not come to terms with this problem.23 The Report suggests that
estimation of the magnitude of liability in mass torts can be a basis for
bankruptcy proceedings to resolve future claims arising from opera-
tions of the debtor.24 The Report, however, does not explore the basis
on which such an estimate could be made, other than by wild guess or
back-of-the-envelope calculation.25 One of the key factors in any such
calculation is the number of victims; the other is the magnitude of the
injuries suffered by each victim. Yet in the typical toxic tort case,
there is dispute between claimants and defendants as to who was in-
jured and in what degree, how many claimants there may be, and how
many claimants have real injuries versus how many only nuisance
value claims.
If reliable estimates can be made in these dimensions, i.e., the
number of claimants and the average size of a claim, of course bank-
ruptcy could handle the problem. But so could ordinary civil proce-
dures. All the identified claimants could be brought in through the
mechanism of the class suit, or a bill of peace (essentially a suit against
a defendant class), or simple multiple joinder of claimants. All de-
fendants can similarly be brought in.26 On the other hand, if reliable
The range of liability, within the limits supposed in the text, is $1000 (10 x $100)
to $10 billion (10,000 x $1,000,000). The liabilities in the asbestos cases and tobacco
settlements run into many billions and those in the breast implant proposed settle-
ments into the low billions.
22 See 1 NATIONAL BANKR. REvIEw COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 315-50 (1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCYREPORT].
24 See id. at 341-45.
2 Compare id. at 343 (explaining the omission of a prescribed method of estimation
as a deliberate choice that preserves "flexibility" for the court and parties), with Edith
H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Re-
form?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (1998) (urging "caution before bankruptcy courts
enter deeper into the mass tort litigation fray").
26 Bankruptcy has peculiar advantages regarding personal jurisdiction and subject-
matter jurisdiction. Regarding personal jurisdiction, bankruptcy process runs
throughout the country, indeed perhaps throughout the world. See FED. R. BANKR. P
7004(d) (authorizing nationwide service of process); Harold S. Burman, Harmonization
of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543,
2553 (1996) (noting that § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code has been construed to give
bankruptcy courts "jurisdiction to issue orders affecting the debtor's estate wherever
located"). The federal bankruptcy court has jurisdiction without regard to citizenship
of the parties or the presence of any federal substantive claims. See 28 U.S.C.
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estimates of liability cannot be made, then the financial predicate for
bankruptcy simply does not exist. 7 When this occurs it is simply im-
possible to determine whether the obligor's liabilities exceed its as-
sets-and hence whether there is a condition fairly to be described as
bankruptcy.
Of course, one could pretend that the liabilities exceed the assets
if it is established that there is some degree of risk that this may be so.
But there are legal limits to such manipulation.2s There are also prac-
tical limits, since subjecting a business to bankruptcy governance can
seriously interfere with its ability to manage operations normally.
Also, since bankruptcy is a basis ofjurisdiction specified in the Consti-
tution,2 there are constitutional limits to the legal fictions that may be
employed tojustify bankruptcy intervention.
There is a further practical problem when "futures" are involved, a
problem that Francis McGovern has called "elasticity." Professor
McGovern noted that in the breast implant litigation, when settlement
was proposed on the basis of a multi-billion dollar tender by the de-
fendants, the number of claimants dramatically escalated from hun-
dreds to thousands. 0 This demonstrates the problem of uncertainty
in estimating the magnitude of claims involved in mass torts involving
futures. "Elasticity" could therefore be considered a euphemism for
indeterminacy.
A bankruptcy solution also poses difficulties of a technical variety.
There is the initial question of a jury trial. Unless the bankruptcy
court has proper "bankruptcy" jurisdiction, sole adjudication of the
claims before the bankruptcy judge involves a deprivation of the right
to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution."1 The
§ 157(c) (2) (1994) (providing federal bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over core
and related proceedings).
In my opinion there is no basis for reliable estimates in the kinds of mass torts
for which bankruptcy procedure has been tendered as a solution. Here I rely on a very
thoughtful paper by Candice Toll, submitted in a seminar given by Judge Anthony
Scirica and myself in 1998 at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. See Candice
Moore Toll, Bankruptcy and Mass Torts: The Proper Venue (1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University ofPennsylvania Law Review).
2' SeeFED. R. BANKR. P. 1008 (stating that "all petitions, lists, schedules, statements
and amendments thereto shall be verified").
2 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to create "uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
30 The sudden appearance of new claimants parallels the need for the bus driver to
close the bus's doors after an accident. See supra note 5.
31 See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 45 (1990) ("If a party does not submit a
claim against the bankruptcy estate.., the preference defendant is entitled to a jury
trial.").
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additional constitutional problem of a bankruptcy court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction arises if the enterprise is not insolvent in any real
sense. The public convenience of an orderly claims procedure is not
the equivalent of practical necessity in dividing limited assets among
creditors whose claims exceed the debtor's estate. Neither does the
concept of "reorganization," as used in Chapter 11, seem to be an
adequate basis for establishing a federal claims adjustment administra-
tion.
But the problems for "futures" are deeper than simply whether
class suit procedure is adaptable to deal with them or whether a pro-
ceeding could properly be characterized as a bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion. Nor is the inability of our legal system to deal with hypothetical
claimants merely a concomitant of protecting the right to jury trial, or
having an adversary system, or the limitations of federal jurisdiction.
Essentially the same problem would be posed by any administrative
agency procedure that could be imagined.
The basic problem is this: if individual claims cannot be specified
in terms of the identity of claimants and the factual basis of their
claims, then there is simply no basis for "adjudication" of unknown
claims on the part of unknown claimants.
IV. THE TRAGEDY OF THE ASBESTOS FUTURES
It seems to me this was the essential problem that confronted the
Supreme Court in the Amehem and Ortiz cases." How can hypothetical
claimants have their potential claims conclusively adjudicated in a
present proceeding?
In neither Amchem nor Ortiz was the proceeding predicated on the
insolvency of the obligor and hence based on an accepted concept of
in rem jurisdiction. The Court in Ortiz was particularly critical of the
lower court's characterization of the proceeding as one involving a
"limited fund" under Rule 23(b) (1) (b).3 The concept of "limited
fund" in Rule 23 has historical origin in the in rem concept and is es-
sentially the equivalent of the bankruptcy concept.!4 Thus, Ortiz not
12 In my view, the Ortiz case presented a different problem in that the case could
have been treated as a controversy over a "limited fund" as that term is used in Federal
Rule 23. There was a real issue whether the assets of the obligor, Fibreboard Corp.,
exceeded its liability to the present and future claimants.
23 SeeOrtizv. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2317 (1999) (stating
that the lower court erred "since there was no adequate demonstration of the second
element required for limited fund treatment").
' See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class
THE FUTURES PROBLEM
only directly disapproves the use of Rule 23 for "futures," but also sug-
gests that a bankruptcy solution would stand on equally dubious foot-
ing.
In both Anchem and Ortiz there was a subsidiary problem of
whether the lawyers purporting to represent the "futures" had a con-
flict of interest under prevailing ethical standards because those law-
yers also represented the present claimants."" This translated into a
concern, perhaps justified, that the claimants' lawyers had negotiated
settlements overly generous for their present clients but too penurious
for the futuressm
The issue addressed initially in Amehem and the central focus in
Ortiz, however, was whether, as a matter of constitutional due process,
a judgment could conclusively determine claims of the futures. The
Court could well be uneasy with the proposition that a futures claim-
ant could be bound by a judgment where neither his identity nor the
existence or magnitude of his injuries have yet been established.
There were two potential arguments in response to this challenge.
One was that the formula for settlement of the future claims had been
reasonably calibrated to similar claims of the present claimants. In
other words, one could say that the schedule for the futures thus was
fair in fact. The other contention was that the lower court's finding
that the settlement was "reasonable" was a sufficient proxy on behalf
of the future claimants 7 Neither of these contentions, however, satis-
Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1887-88 (1998) (discussing the development of in rem
class suits in 19th century English law and noting relationship of early cases to later
.common fund" suits).
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) ("In significant
respects, the interests of those within the class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the
currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-
protected fund for the future."); Otiiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (discussing the need for
the division of present and future claims into subclasses to "eliminate conflicting inter-
ests of counsel").
See Susan Koniak, Feasting Wile the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products,
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1064-78 (1995) (discussing the higher settlements ob-
tained for present clients).
37 It might be noted that the findings of "reasonableness" by the trial courts in both
Amchem and Ortiz were functionally the same as the finding of reasonableness in an es-
timate of futures liability contemplated in the Bankruptcy Commission's recommenda-
tion. See supra text accompanying note 24. If ajudicial finding of reasonableness is not
a sufficient proxy for an approval by a claimant in a class suit such as Amchem or Oft/z, it
is difficult to see how a bankruptcy court's estimate of future liability could withstand
similar due process challenges. The force of this point is the greater when one recalls
that (tiz was framed as a "limited fund" case, i.e., one where the available assets were
exceeded by the anticipated liabilities.
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fled the Supreme Court.
The tragedy of the futures in Amchaen and Ortiz is pedestrian but
stark. Since the Supreme Court disapproved the settlements, the par-
ties have simply proceeded with ad hoc settlements generally based on
the formulas that previously were incorporated in the now-invalidated
trial court decrees. The settlements usually occur in batches managed
by a small set of asbestos claimant lawyers, who have engagements
based on individual contingent fee contracts. New claimants continue
to appear, often as a result of medical examinations and x-rays funded
by the various labor unions in cooperation with plaintiffs' lawyers.
The "futures" thereby become present claimants and enter into con-
tingent fee agreements that typically provide the standard one-third
fee (although some provide for 40%). The attorneys' fee provision
under Amchen's invalidated court decree was 25%.3' If an asbestos
claimant, speaking through plaintiffs' counsel, does not want to settle
on the basis of formulas such as those proposed in Amchem and Ortiz,
the claimant is theoretically free to proceed to trial. However, the
right to bring an asbestos case to trial is subject to significant impedi-
ments. The asbestos cases in the federal courts have all been re-
manded to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where most of them
have been put on de facto permanent standby while the transferee
court conducts what amounts to a "'centralized, mandatory alternative
dispute resolution system for ad hoc resolution of the highly individu-
alized claims of asbestos personal injury victims.' 39 These cases are
not being tried in Philadelphia, nor are they being remanded to the
other districts from which they originated.4' Hence, they must settle at
a discount reflecting the fact that their cases cannot be brought to
trial. The cases in various state courts are subject to various civil cal-
endar delays in many parts of the country. They are also subject to
See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1994), va-
cated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
39 Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Rejects Attempt To Remand Asbestos Cases, LEGAL
INTEL. GENCER, Apr. 13, 2000, at 1 (quoting the lead counsel for three groups of
plaintiffs seeking a writ of mandamus to order theJPML to remand their cases).
40 See In reJoann Patenaude, No. 99-1540, 2000 WL 369789, at *1-4 (3d Cir. Apr. 11,
2000) (describing the seven-year history of an unsuccessful attempt by several groups
of asbestos plaintiffs to have their cases remanded to their respective transferor
courts). The district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has remanded cases
only when the claimant was "seriously ill or dying and all avenues of settlement were
exhausted," but even then "has a practice ... of severing and retaining jurisdiction
over punitive damage claims." Id. at *3 & n.3 (internal quotation omitted). The con-
ditions this policy imposes on plaintiffs desiring to have their claims brought to trial
are onerous to say the least.
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the usual risk of a low verdict or a defense verdict, because not all
claimants win "big," if they win at all. These claimants also must pay
their lawyers at contingent fee rates. Most of the cases settle on this
basis.
Defendants are usually willing to negotiate settlements based on
the formulae in the now-invalid settlement agreements. The defen-
dants, however, are rational actors. If settlement fails they put up stiff
defenses in order to maintain downward pressure on settlement val-
ues. The resulting cost structure for administering these claims
probably approximates the structure prior to the attempted settle-
ments in Amchem and Ortiz. According to the RAND Institute, the cost
structure in litigated cases comprised two-thirds transaction costs-
primarily fees for lawyers on both sides-and one-third claimant com-
pensation.4 ' The widows may not be weeping but neither are they
dancing in the streets.4
V. A FUTURE FOR CLASS SUITS?
The Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz therefore seems to fore-
doom any use of Rule 23 to resolve futures claims in mass torts injury
cases. But the pathway in the Court's analysis also raises serious ques-
tions about other uses of Rule 23. Specifically, the analysis raises ques-
tions that could also embarrass injunction class suits, such as the kinds
of decrees commonly employed in race and gender discrimination
cases. The basis of such embarrassment can be briefly described as
follows.
In the course of holding the lower courtjudgment invalid as to fu-
tures claims in Orti, Justice Souter called attention to two procedural
interests that were compromised by the use of Rule 23. These obser-
vations were vague but are highly suggestive. One observation con-
cerned the right to ajury trial; the other concerned the "right" of an
individual to an individual day in court.
As to the right to ajury trial,Justice Souter wrote:
[T]he certification of a mandatory class followed by settlement of its ac-
tion for money damages obviously implicates the Seventh Amendment
jury trial rights of absent class members. We noted in Ross v. Bernhard
4, See JAMM S. KAxAuK ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, VARIATIONS IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND ExPENsEs xvii (1984) (finding that com-
pensation for plaintiffs averaged 39% of every dollar spent by defendants and insurers
in the litigation).
4 See supra note 36 (making use of Koniak's title image).
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that since the merger of law and equity in 1938, it has become settled
among the lower courts that "class action plaintiffs may obtain ajury trial
on any legal issues they present." By its nature, however, a mandatory
settlement-only class action with legal issues and future claimants com-
promises their Seventh Amendment rights without their consent.43
If the denial of ajury trial is a reason for invalidating a money set-
tlement in a Rule 23 class suit, it would seem no less a reason for in-
validating any class-wide judgment under Rule 23. That is, the objec-
tion seems equally applicable to all adjudications leading to what was
formerly called an equitable decree. Beginning with a line of deci-
sions commencing over forty years ago in Beacon Theatres v. Westover,
the Court has held that the right to ajury trial applies in equity suits as
well as in "suits at common law.""4 The term "suits at common law" is
of course the language of the Seventh Amendment in which the jury
trial right is guaranteed. But Beacon and its progeny such as Ross v.
46Bernhard," to which Justice Souter expressly referred, had held that
the Enabling Act extended the jury trial right to equitable proceed-
ings. Beacon Theatres indeed mapped out how the right to a jury trial
could be applied in all contested liability issues, even issues that were
traditionally equitable.4 7 This line of analysis can lead to the conclu-
sion that a jury trial should be available where the issue is, for exam-
ple, whether prison administration or employment practices have
been sufficiently racially discriminatory to justify an injunction against
such conduct in the future. If this line of analysis governs Rule 23, no
adjudication, and presumably no settlement either, would be permis-
sible if its effect would be to preclude ajury trial for an absent class
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2314 (1999) (citations
omitted).
4 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) (delineating
the right to ajury trial in the adjudication of equitable claims).
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
46 See Ort, 119 S. Ct. at 2314 (citing Ross v. Bernhard).
47 See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508. The opinion notes that:
Under the Federal Rules the same court may try both legal and equitable
causes in the same action. Thus any defenses, equitable or legal, Fox may
have to charges of antitrust violations can be raised either in its suit for de-
claratory relief or in answer to Beacon's counterclaim. On proper showing,
harassment by threats of other suits.., could be temporarily enjoined pend-
ing the outcome of this litigation. Whatever permanent injunctive relief Fox
might be entitled to on the basis of the decision in this case could, of course,
be given by the court after the jury renders its verdict. In this way the issues
between these parties could be settled in one suit giving Beacon a full jury




The Court's observation concerning an individual's "fight" to an
individual day in court is even more far-reaching. In this connection
the Court said:
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damage claims implicate the due
process principle of general application in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence that one is not bound by ajudgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a
party by service of process, it being our deep-rooted historic tradition
that everyone should have his own day in court. Although we have rec-
ognized an exception to the general rule... in certain limited circum-
stances[,] . . . the burden ofjustification rests on the exception.
The inherent tension between representative suits and the day-in-
court ideal is only, magnified if applied to damage claims gathered in a
mandatory class.
This language clearly suggests that there is an individual right to a
day in court, presumably a fight of constitutional dimension. But if
there is such a fight, it surely precludes the use of a class suit for any
purpose. The very essence of a class suit is that it determines fights of
individuals who are not to have their individual day in court. As Pro-
fessor Chaffee stated many years ago:
However convenient class suits may be, it is obvious that they do not
comply with some well-recognized general principles of law. The incon-
gruity which startles us today is the disregard of the requirement that a
man ought to have his day in court-his rights and duties should not be
adjudicated in his absence.
4 9
Perhaps Ortiz thus has ended class suits of all kinds, not simply
those involving futures claims. Under such a regime, all mass injury
proceedings would require notice and a fight to opt out as required
by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts for state court class suits. 5 Notice with
a fight to opt out appears to be, in terms of procedural mechanics and
due process theory, essentially multi-partyjoinder. At least reasonable
legal argument to this effect is now open.
VI. A "SUBSTANTIVE" SOLUTION
Many serious discussions concerning mass torts have usually con-
43 Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314-15 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
4 ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, J., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUrY 203 (1950).
5o See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding, in the
context of state court class suits, that "due process requires at a minimum that an ab-
sent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class").
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cluded that there should be some kind of legislative solution. Amchem
and Ortiz may have closed all other avenues of relief."1 Obviously, such
a solution would have to come from Congress because mass torts, vir-
tually by definition, are not confined to a single state jurisdiction. 2
However, there are notorious perils involved in obtaining from Con-
gress coherent legislation addressing a complicated and controversial
problem. It seems highly improbable that Congress could bring itself
to address a specific mass tort, for example, asbestos or the breast im-
plant situation.5  By the time a mass tort has become recognized as
such, the interest alignments would have hardened to produce the
usual legislative deadlocks we have learned to endure. The industries
are powerful enough to block solutions that claimants might regard as
fair and just, and the plaintiff's bar has become influential enough to
block many solutions that industry would be willing to accept. Hence,
it is a reasonably safe prediction that no legislative solutions will be
forthcoming for mass torts from specific product categories, at least in
the foreseeable future. This includes bankruptcy "solutions."
Perhaps the Supreme Court will come to appreciate that no legis-
lative solution is likely to be forthcoming, that bankruptcy is no an-
51 See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2323, 2324 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (opining that the
asbestos situation "cries out for a legislative solution").
52 The hotel fire cases are perhaps an exception. See PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS
TORT LITIGATION § 1.3 (1996) (noting that the hotel fire cases are prominent exam-
ples of "single situs cases"). Even these cases can be considered as arising in interstate
commerce because the guests include people from out of state and, in the modem
configuration of these cases, claims are asserted against all kinds of suppliers to the
hotels-manufacturers of rugs, for example, as well as smoke alarms. See Dennis E.
Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and
the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 1003 & n.72 (1993) (listing possible
plaintiffs in hotel fire cases and citing such a case).
5S The only industry-specific mass torts legislative resolution of which I am aware is
the brown lung statute for coal miners, sponsored by Senator Robert Byrd. The cir-
cumstances under which that legislation was adopted seem unique, including the
unique position of Senator Byrd at the time. In any event the legislation is hardly a
model. SeeERNEST GELLHORN, THE "BLAcKLUNG" ACT: ANANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES
RAISED UNDER THE BENEFIT PROGRAM CREATED BY THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH
AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969 (As AMENDED) 4-6 (1981) (discussing various interpretive
problems that have arisen under the original bill and subsequent amendments).
I do not believe that the innovations of 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) and (h) provide a per-
suasive counterexample. Although Congress thereby created that statutory authority
for channeling injunctions in asbestos litigation in the Chapter 11 context, it did so by
merely ratifying, in numbing detail, the precise structure of an existing court-ordered
injunction. See BANKRUPTcY REPORT, supra note 23, at 320-22. Not only did this avoid
any real engagement of legislative process or expertise, the specificity of the provision
means that it gives little help to courts facing asbestos litigation if that approved trust
structure proves infeasible, and no help to courts facing non-asbestos claims.
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swer, and that settlements for futures in the mode of Amchem and Ortiz
are anomalous in terms of strict due process, but that the ordinary
procedure of civil litigation involves very high transaction costs to
claimants. Perhaps the Court could also recognize that ordinary pro-
cedure involves comparable anomalies in due process. After all, the
Court's own decisions resolve important rights of thousands of people
who have never been in court at all.'
Be that as it may, in the mode of entering where angels fear to
tread, I tender a conception of a "substantive" solution to mass torts
problems. It is a federal statute that would provide essentially as fol-
lows:
1. The statute would cover distributors of products or services at-
tended by some risk of causing multiple personal injuries. This
would include, for example, automobiles, drugs, prosthetic de-
vices, transportation services, hotels, liability for slip and fall
and for intruder-caused injuries, and so on.
2. The statute would provide an elective procedure rather than a
compulsory one. That is, a potential target of claims of this
kind could register its good or service with a federal agency,
such as the Commerce Department, as a "limited strict liability"
product or service. If the good or service were thus registered,
the statutory provisions apply; otherwise the ordinary law of
torts and commercial liability would apply.
3. The distributor of such a registered product or service would be
subject to liability without proof of fault for all injuries in which
the product or service is the substantial cause. (Various formu-
lations of the proximity of cause can be envisioned-a "substan-
tial" cause or "legal" cause, for example.) The distributor of
the product or service would have to establish financial respon-
sibility for the prospective liability (through insurance, for ex-
ample).
4. The measure of recovery would be based on the workers' com-
pensation formula in the state where the claimant resides or,
for nonresidents, the District of Columbia's formula. The re-
covery could be a multiple of that measure, for example, 150%
54 SeeJack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Acions, 9 BUFF.
L. REV. 433, 446 (1960) ("It is an anomalous but accepted characteristic of our system
that a decision on the law effectively binds non-parties without upsetting our assurance
that due process has been done .... ").
20001 1917
1918 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1901
of the formula's allowance for lost wages. Special provision
could be made for the unemployed, for example.
The only alternative to this proposal is to soldier on with the pres-
ent law of torts and procedure. In the immediate future, the status
quo is unlikely to change.
